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Japanese zinc production grew dramatically from 1950 
until the early 1970s. Since 1973, however, the oil crises 
and the steep appreciation of the yen have adversely 
affected the competitiveness of the Japanese zinc smelters.
This study considers the role of public policy in the 
shifting fortunes of the Japanese zinc smelting industry, 
examining tariffs on zinc imports, government funded 
stockpiling, assistance to domestic mines, pollution 
regulations, and other public policies. It concludes that 
government policy did not play a central role in creating 
the competitiveness of the industry prior to 1973. Nor has 
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Until the early 1970s, world slab zinc production was 
concentrated in Western industrialized countries. During the 
early decades of this century, more than 9 0% of zinc metal 
was produced in Europe and the United States. After World 
War II, however, the Japanese zinc smelting industry, 
initiated early in the century, became significant in world 
zinc markets. In 1960, Japan produced 181,000 metric tons of 
slab zinc accounting for 7.4% of the total zinc metal 
produced in free market economy countries. In that year, 
Japan was ranked fifth in production, following the United 
States, Belgium, Canada, and West Germany. After that, 
Japanese zinc production grew dramatically, and, in 1972, 
Japan became the world's largest producer. Production 
exceeded 800,000 tons and the country's production share 
reached nearly 20%.
After 1973, the oil crises and the appreciation of the 
nation's currency created a nightmare for the Japanese zinc 
smelters, adversely affecting cost competitiveness. The oil 
crises raised energy costs, especially for electricity, a 
critical factor in assessing competitiveness. The 
appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar raised the 
relative operating costs of smelters. It should be noted
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that both factors were more of a handicap to Japanese 
smelters than to smelters in any other country. Curiously 
enough, the Japanese zinc smelting industry has maintained 
its leading position, and its production share remains at 
about 13%, even today.
This study will examine the international 
competitiveness of the Japanese zinc smelting industry and 
will explore how industrial policy has affected the 
smelters' competitiveness since 1960. The key questions the 
study attempts to answer are these:
1. Why has Japanese smelting industry grown so rapidly?
What, strategies and market conditions have favored 
growth?
2. After the oil crisis, how has the competitiveness of the 
Japanese zinc smelters changed? Are they still 
competitive today?
3. How have Japanese industrial policies worked before and 
after the oil crises? Have they played a central role in 
the growth of the zinc smelting industry? Did they serve 
to protect the zinc smelters, especially after the oil 
crisis?
4. Has the existence of indigenous mines affected the 
competitiveness of smelters and the nature of industrial 
policy?
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This study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
basic knowledge about the Japanese zinc market. Topics 
covered are trends in demand and supply, market structure, 
and pricing behavior of producers. Chapter 3 examines the 
era of rapid growth in Japanese zinc production over the 
1950-197 3 period, focusing on the behavior of the producers 
and on public policy goals and effects of specific measures. 
Chapter 4 deals with factors that adversely affect the 
competitiveness of the industry after 1973, the response of 
industrial policies, and current competitiveness. Finally, 




THE JAPANESE ZINC INDUSTRY
2.1 Market Trends Since 1960
The year 1960 is an important turning point in the 
post-war history of the Japanese economy. It marked Japan's 
move to an open economy system, the end of the 
reconstruction era, and the beginning of the "rapid growth 
era" of the Japanese economy.
With rapid growth, the domestic consumption of metallic 
zinc increased steeply through the 1960s. Consumption peaked 
in fiscal 1973, slightly exceeding 800,000 metric tons 
(Figure 2.1). The average annual growth rate of the Japanese 
market from 1960 to 1973 was about 11.9%, notably higher 
than the 5% the rest of world's zinc market experienced. 
After the first oil crisis in 1973, however, consumption 
declined to 598,000 tons or by 26% from fiscal years 1973 to 
197 5. After that, although consumption recovered to more 
than 7 00,000 tons, it never again attained the peak of 197 3.
The largest direct source of domestic demand for zinc 
has been the steel industry for the manufacture of 
galvanized steel sheet, which is used mainly in the 
automotive and construction industries. Almost 50% of total 
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Figure 2.1
Consumption and Exports of Zinc Metal, Japan
Source: Bulletin of Japan Minina Industry Association, 1978 
and 1989, JMIA, Tokyo.
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2.1). Zinc use in die casting, on the other hand, exceeded 
its use in copper-based alloy (brass) by 1970, and has been 
the second major use of zinc since then. The growth in die 
casting use mostly reflects the growth of the Japanese
automotive industry through the 1960s. However, the weakened
demand for zinc after the oil crisis is typically tied to 
the decline of zinc use in die casting. Many applications of 
zinc die casting have been eroded by substitutes such as 
plastics and by progress in metal-saving technologies, 
mainly in the automotive industry. Zinc consumption for 
galvanized sheet and brass has regained or exceeded its 197 3 
level.
Exports have not been an important part of the total 
demand for zinc produced in Japan. Exports, which flow 
mainly to the United States, peaked in 1974, yet accounted 
for a mere 15.7% of total demand. Further, exports declined
thereafter in terms of both the quantity and the proportion,
as shown in Figure 2.1.
Domestic production of slab zinc also rapidly increased 
throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s, peaking in 1972 at 
835,000 tons (Figure 2.2). The first oil crisis also seems 
to have been an important turning point in domestic 
production? production declined greatly in 1975 and has 
never regained its peak. It is appropriate to analyze the 
Japanese zinc smelting industry in two separate periods: the
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Table 2.1
Demand Structure of Japanese Zinc Market 
(in thousand metric tons)
Fiscal Year 1960 1965 1970 1973 1975 1980 1985 1987
Sal vanned Sheet S3.7 127.6 219.8 318.4 277.8 325.7 322.0 350.9
(Share, X) (42.0) (37.6) (35.6) (39.4) (46.5) (46.3) (44.4) (46.9)
Other Galvanized Products 35.5 81.0 112.4 133.5 99.2 120.2 106.1 103.7
(Share, X) (17.8) (23.9) (18.2) (16.5) (16.6) (17.1) (14.6) (13.9)
Subtotal 119.2 208.6 332.2 451.9 377.0 445.9 428.1 454.6
(Share, X) (59.9) (61.5) (53.9) (56.0) (63.1) (63.3) (59.0) (60.3)
Die Cast 22.2 41.6 113.7 153.3 97.7 119.0 111.4 110.3
(Share, X) (11.2) (12.3) (18.4) (19.0) (16.3) (16.9) (15.4) (14.8)
Copper-based Alloy 31.A 46.3 80.2 102.3 80.9 98.4 102.8 103.9
(Share, X) (15.8) (13.6) (13.0) (12.7) (13.5) (14.0) (14.2) (13.9)
Other Uses 26.3 42.7 90.6 100.1 42.2 40.8 83.1 78.8
(Share, X) (13.2) (12.6) (14.7) (12.4) (7.1) (5.8) (11.5) (10,5)
Total Consuaption 199.2 339.1 616.7 807.6 597.8 704.1 725.4 747.6
(Share, X) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Yearbook of Minina, Nonferrous Metals, and Product 
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Figure 2.2
Production and Imports of Zinc Metal, Japan
Note: Production includes primary and secondary supply of 
zinc.
Source: Bulletin of Japan Mining Industry Association. 1978 
and 1989, JMIA, Tokyo.
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years before the oil crisis (Chapter 3) and the years after 
the oil crisis (Chapter 4) .
Imports of slab zinc have been of little significance 
to the Japanese zinc market (Figure 2.2). It is worthwhile 
to note that the Japanese zinc market has been basically 
self-sufficient. However, a closer look at the zinc metal 
balance of the market, which is calculated by subtracting 
domestic consumption and changes in inventory and public 
stockpile from domestic production, reveals that although 
the quantity of zinc involved is relatively small, the 
Japanese market has been more than self-sufficient; since 
1965, it has also been export-oriented (Figure 2.3). What 
should be noted here is that the export-oriented nature of 
the market was not affected by the oil crisis. The positive 
metal balance (which indicates domestic production exceeds 
domestic demand for zinc) continued until 1984 but has been 
negative since then.
Finally, a word on the supply structure of zinc ore. 
Zinc has been one of the few minerals of significance in 
Japan. In 1987, Japan was the ninth largest zinc ore- 
producing country among the market economy countries. Until 
the early 1950s, indigenous ores constituted the raw 
material for all of Japan's slab zinc. The situation has 
since changed. Figure 2.4 illustrates the amounts of both 
domestic and imported ore refined and smelted in Japan from
T-3887 10
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Zinc Metal Balance in Japan
Note: The balances are accounted for by primary and
secondary zinc production, consumption, and change in 
inventory and public stockpile.
Source: Data from Bulletin of Japan Minina Industry 
























FISCAL YEAR  
PRIM AR Y ZIN C  DOMESTIC ORE IM PORTED ORE
Figure 2•4
Japanese Consumption of Domestic Ore and Imported Ore, 
and the Production of Primary Zinc Metal
Source: Bulletin of Japan Minina Industry Association. 1978 
and 1989, JMIA, Tokyo.
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1960 through 1987, and the trend of the country's primary 
zinc production during those years. Two notable features of 
the supply structure of zinc ore emerge. First, Japan's 
consumption of imported ore increased rapidly after 1960 and 
exceeded that of domestic ore by 19 67. Dependence on 
imported ore (the amount of imported ore smelted/primary 
zinc production) was about 72% in 1987; the figure for 1960 
was only 2 6%.
Second, annual consumption of domestic ore has been 
relatively stable even though there have been wide 
fluctuations in primary zinc production. It appears that 
imported ore has been used as a cushion for the 
fluctuations; imports have risen and fallen in tandem with 
primary zinc production, indicating that the smelters 
preferentially consume.domestic zinc ore first.
2.2 Market Structure
The Japanese zinc smelting industry started with a 
smelter in Osaka in 1912. Today, six companies control 
Japan's 854,000 metric tons of domestic smelting capacity. 
All six zinc producers— Mitsui Mining and Smelting, 
Mitsubishi Metal, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Nippon Mining, Dowa 
Mining, and Toho Zinc— had started zinc smelting by the mid- 
1960s. No new companies have since entered the industry. The 
companies are known as major nonferrous metals mining and
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smelting companies, rather than just as primary zinc 
producers. Their sales are generally well diversified among 
copper, lead, and other nonferrous metals. The proportions 
of zinc sales are less than 10%, except for Toho Zinc. 
(Toho's slab zinc sales are about 50% of its total sales).
One notable feature of the structure of the Japanese 
zinc market is the absence of vertical integration. Japanese 
smelters are far less integrated vertically in both upstream 
and downstream stages than are the North American and 
European zinc smelters. All Japanese smelters started out as 
more or less upstream integrated smelters. Three out of the 
six companies —  Mitsui, Nippon, and Dowa —  control the 
entire domestic mine capacity today. The five zinc mines in 
Japan are operated as subsidiaries of the three companies. 
The current self-supply ratios of zinc concentrates for the 
three companies amount to about 30% (Mitsui), 40% (Nippon), 
and 60% (Dowa). Other smelters are entirely dependent on 
imported ore and concentrate. Outside interests of the 
Japanese companies are limited to a small mine in Peru.
The structure of the downstream stage of the industry 
seems somewhat complicated. For example, several big steel 
producers and their contractors produce almost all 
galvanized steel sheet through both hot-dip and electrolytic 
methods. In addition, about a hundred small companies 
specializing in hot-dip galvanizing produce products as
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heavy as galvanized steel pipes and as light as nuts and 
bolts. Die casting, on the other hand, is in the domain of 
automotive parts producers and some other companies. Some 
zinc smelters (Mitsui's, for instance) are in the die- 
casting business, but their control or share of the market 
is rather small. In addition, the role of trading companies, 
so-called "sougou shosha," is very important in the 
distribution stage. Trading companies are responsible for 
purchasing and marketing all zinc-related products, both at 
home and abroad.
The reluctance of the smelters to integrate downstream 
is rooted in Japan's industrial history. Japanese zinc 
smelters were member firms of pre-World War II "zaibatsu." 
The zaibatsu usually covered several industries, and had at 
its center a holding company which was controlled by the 
founder family. One notable feature of the zaibatsu was that 
each member firm specialized in one industry. With respect 
to the nonferrous metals industry, for example, the mining 
and smelting company and the fabricators were usually 
separated within a zaibatsu. Yet both were linked by the 
same bank and by the same trading company, also members of 
the zaibatsu, and traded preferentially with each other.
The zaibatsu conglomerates were broken up during the 
U.S. occupation following the war but have since been 
loosely reconstituted. The newly established relationship
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among companies is called a business group or "keiretsu.M 
Unlike the zaibatsu, member firms of a business group are 
not under the control of a single holding company. Instead, 
the member firms are loosely affiliated through the cross­
holding of equities. As Goto (1987, p. 97) pointed out, 
preferential transactions among group members means that a 
member of a business group is assured of a stable outlet 
without investing either in the fabricating stage or in the 
establishment of a sales organization. Thus, the group 
affiliation offers Japanese zinc smelters an alternative to 
forward vertical integration.
The absence of vertical integration, both forward and 
backward, however, has its problems. First, each Japanese 
zinc producer alone is a relatively small buyer of foreign 
zinc concentrate. The world's mine production of zinc is 
controlled by a small number of large European and North 
American corporations. Under such conditions, the bargaining 
power of small buyers is quite weak. Japanese smelters 
sometimes have had to purchase concentrates under 
disadvantageous terms. Second, since the companies' 
operations have been heavily dependent on the metal 
business, profits have been significantly affected by metal 
prices. Low prices have kept Japanese producers financially 
weak.
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To alleviate the first problem, Japanese producers have 
tried to purchase concentrates collectively to enhance their 
bargaining power. To handle the second problem, producers 
are attempting to diversify by adding non-metal businesses, 
such as real estate and leisure to their mining and refinery 
operations.
2.3 Pricing
Because zinc is an internationally traded commodity, 
its price is determined in the world marketplace. Before 
1988, there were three main price quotations for zinc: the 
U.S producer price, the European Producer Price (EPP), and 
the London Metal Exchange (LME) price. The EPP was abolished 
late in 1988. The two producer prices were usually 
established with LME quotes as a guide. The U.S. producer 
price has been used within the United States. The EPP, on 
the other hand, was determined by the major zinc producers 
in Europe, Canada, and Australia, and used outside the 
United States. The LME price accounted for only about 10% of 
the world market for zinc before the EPP was abolished 
(Jolly, 1985, p. 933).
The EPP was initiated in 1964, the same year the 
Japanese trade liberalization occurred. Thereafter, until 
the EPP was abolished, Japanese domestic zinc metal prices 
conformed to the EPP. There had been two producer prices for
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zinc in Japan: one for "electrolytic zinc,11 quoted for 
Special High Grade (SHG) zinc (more than 99.99% purity) and 
the other for "distilled zinc," quoted for Prime Western 
(PW) zinc (98% pure), a category abolished in late 1988. The 
electrolytic zinc prices were higher than the distilled zinc 
prices because of the difference in zinc purity. These 
domestic producer prices were published by the price leader, 
Mitsui Mining and Smelting, the nation's largest producer of 
zinc.
Meanwhile, the EPP quotes were used for Good Ordinary 
Brand (GOB) zinc, equivalent to Prime Western (98% purity). 
The EPP represents world main port basis CIF price, and the 
prices paid by importers usually vary from country to 
country because of the import duties, inland freight cost 
and the like. Figure 2.5 compares both Japanese distilled 
zinc price and the EPP trends, expressed in Japanese yen. 
Although both prices are quoted for the same purity of zinc, 
the Japanese producer price is obviously higher than the 
EPP. This is because the Japanese producer prices are 
determined on Japanese yen-based EPP, taking into account 
tariff, inland freight from ports to users' factories, fees 
for customs formalities, fees to the trading companies, and 
so forth. In other words, the Japanese producer prices are 
designed to be equal to, or competitive with, the sum of all 
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Figure 2.5
Comparison of Japanese Distilled Zinc Prices 
and European Producer Prices
Source: Mining Industry Handbook, 1973 and 1989, ANRE, 
Tokyo.
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users when they import foreign zinc metal. Japanese producer 
prices, then, fluctuate in accordance not only with the EPP, 
but also with foreign exchange rates, tariff, and users' 
costs related to the importation. Therefore, it should be 
noted that the Japanese producers cannot affect variables 
which determine the domestic producer prices. This means 
that the Japanese producers basically are not price makers 
but price takers.
In the actual transactions, however, the producer 
prices are not always the prices at which zinc is traded in 
Japan. First of all, zinc is rarely traded on the spot 
market. The primary zinc producers and users such as steel 
producers are often linked by group affiliations, and zinc 
is often traded under long-term contracts between them.
Then, the actual trade prices are affected by the relative 
bargaining power between sellers and buyers at the moment of 
negotiation. Further, in recent years, zinc has been more 
than just a homogeneous product in Japan. The major users 
often order various shapes and qualities of zinc; for 
example, zinc alloyed with other metals, such as aluminium, 
manganese, and silicon. As a result, although the actual 
zinc prices are determined based on the producer prices, 




3.1 Growth Prior to Trade Liberalization
The postwar history of the Japanese economy began with 
the so-called "reconstruction era," roughly from 1945 to 
1959. In this period the Japanese government played an 
authoritative and pervasive role in the national economy. 
Government-business relationships can be summarized by the 
phrase "strong government and weak enterprises." Under the 
guidance of the bureaucracy, industrial policy was carried 
out with a strong interventionist flavor.
Japan's industrial policy aimed mostly at the 
modernization of major industries and the development of new 
ones. Early on in this period, reconstruction— the recovery 
from the tremendous decline in output and the standard of 
living— was the general tasks of all economic policy; the 
goal of industrial policy was the resumption of production. 
Along with other industries, such as ammonium sulfate and 
electric power, coal and steel were given special emphasis 
as targets in what is known as the "priority production" 
policy. During the late 1950s, the focus of industrial 
policy moved to the fostering and promotion of new and 
growth industries. The targets of promotion policies were, 
for instance, synthetic fibers, petrochemicals, machinery
T —3887 21
parts and general machinery, and electronics. The policies 
were supported by a variety of direct and powerful measures, 
such as subsidies, tax relief, and long-term, low-interest 
funds.
The zinc smelters, although substantially damaged by 
the war, received almost no help. The nonferrous metals 
industry as a whole was not a target of either the 
reconstruction policies or the promotion policies. It 
received only a moderate subsidy from February 1947 to April 
1949. Nonetheless, during this period, overall resource 
allocation in the Japanese economy took place through the 
price system but within the context of a protective 
government policy that allocated imports and regulated 
foreign direct investment. Under the restriction on zinc 
imports, carried out through the strict foreign currency 
control of the government, the zinc smelting industry began 
to revive because of the expanding demand for zinc directly 
caused by Korean War in 1950. Thereafter, domestic 
production increased from 58,000 metric tons in fiscal 1950 
to 172,000 tons in 1959. But, because domestic mine 
production could not meet the increase in slab zinc 
production, the government in 1951 began to allocate foreign 
currency to the smelters to allow them to import foreign 
concentrate.
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With the fixing of the exchange rate at 3 60 yen to the 
U.S. dollar and other measures taken in 1949, Japan's 
participation in world markets progressively increased, and 
the country's dependence on trade began to rise. In the late 
1950s, demand for the freeing of trade arose in earnest. At 
the same time, foreign pressure on Japan, especially from 
the U.S. government, to speed up liberalization increased.
In 1960 the Japanese government announced a trade and 
foreign exchange liberalization plan for the transition from 
protectionism to a free trade system.
Trade liberalization was a serious problem for the 
Japanese nonferrous metals industry, simply because their 
products, both ore and metal, were less competitive even 
within the domestic market on account of high production 
costs. Producers gathered and collectively requested the 
government to back up the industry politically. In response, 
realizing that the industry was basic to an industrialized 
economy, the government enacted the Metallic Mineral 
Stabilization Temporary Measures Law in July 1963 (this law 
was effective until March 1968). The law provided policy 
guidelines rather than actual, specific policy measures to 
support the mineral producers. In the law, following goals 
were specifically emphasized (JMIA, 1968, p. 89):
(1) to promote the exploration of domestic mineral 
resources promptly, efficiently, and
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systematically;
(2) to promote the development of the domestic and 
overseas resources;
(3) to promote the rationalization of mining, 
processing, and ore-transportation facilities and 
equipment; and,
(4) to promote the rationalization of the smelters. 
Along with the law, the Overseas Mineral Resource 
Development, Inc., was established in September 1962 by 22 
mining companies and a government agency (the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund) to finance overseas resource 
development activities. Also, in May 19 63, the Metal Mining 
Agency of Japan was established to finance indigenous 
resource exploration activities. An important implication of 
the law and related notion of the government at that time 
was that the emphasis was to be largely on the stabilization 
of the supply of primary mineral resources from both 
domestic and overseas sources. Although a government goal 
was to promote rationalization of smelters, it did not 
provide any special financial opportunities or other 
measures such as tax relief and subsidies for smelters. It 
should be kept in mind that the industrial policy of the 
Japanese government for nonferrous metals industry has 
always focused on the mining sector rather than on the
MTHUm LAKES 
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smelting and refining sector. The origin of this focus can 
be found in the Temporary Measures Law.
In 1964, when Japan became formally an IMF's Article 8 
nation, imports of slab zinc were liberalized. 
Simultaneously, the Japanese primary zinc producers were 
exposed to international competition. In the remaining part 
of this chapter, the behavior of the zinc smelters and the 
policies which affected them until the oil crisis will be 
examined. The next section surveys how zinc producers dealt 
with liberalization and what specific market conditions were 
advantageous for the producers. The period following trade 
liberalization was one of prosperity for Japanese zinc 
producers, the period when Japan became the leading zinc- 
producing country in the world.
3.2 Creation of Competitiveness
Before trade liberalization, domestic prices of 
nonferrous base metals were generally higher than foreign 
prices, primarily because of higher mine and smelter 
production costs (Kuroko, 1989, p. 103). To be profitable, 
Japanese zinc producers practiced monopolistic pricing in 
the domestic market under the imports and capital 
restrictions. Thus, when trade was liberalized, the 
possibility was great that the expanding domestic market 
would be dominated by zinc metal imports.
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In the face of trade liberalization, the main problem 
awaiting solution for the zinc smelters was the improvement 
of cost competitiveness. At that time, high production costs 
were thought to be generated primarily by the absence of 
scale; in other words, the productive capacities were 
believed to be too small to attain sufficient economies of 
scale. Thus, capacity expansion became the most urgent and 
necessary strategy for the smelters. In addition, in the 
expansion process, the following were pursued to construct 
efficient capacity: (1) improving technology, (2) taking a
joint venture approach, and (3) constructing refineries in 
coastal areas.
Technology, needless to say, is one of the most 
critical sources of competitiveness for industries today. 
After the war, the Japanese smelters were eager to import 
and absorb foreign zinc smelting technologies, simply 
because their technology level was so far behind. For 
example, the vertical distillation method, which is far more 
efficient than the horizontal one, was introduced to Japan 
in 1950; it had been used in the United States since 1929. 
Japanese producers were in a most advantageous position to 
utilize the newest technology already available and 
developed in other nations. They could "choose" rather than 
"develop" the efficient technologies they needed, thereby 
minimizing their investment in technology development. With
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trade liberalization, action to catch up with American and 
European technology accelerated. By 1970, all the "obsolete1* 
horizontal distillation plants were replaced. Some foreign 
producers were still using this method. Traditional 
electrolysis plants were renovated. The most advanced zinc 
reduction method was introduced, the blast furnace process, 
also known as the ISP (or ISF) method developed by Rio Tinto 
Zinc, Co. around 1950. An important advantage claimed for 
the process was its ability to treat a mixed zinc-lead 
concentrate and recover both metals, as well as any gold or 
silver present, with no extra reducing agent consumption and 
little extra labor (Jolly, 1985, p. 928) . Two ISP plants 
were set up, Harima in 1966 and Hachinohe in 1969 (Table 
3.1).
Large scale capacity expansion was possible through the 
joint venture approach. Although they are known to compete 
fiercely with each other, one of the characteristics of 
Japanese producers is "they are often interrelated and often 
work together" (Wang and Chin, 1978, P. 147). Japan's 
biggest electrolysis refinery (Iijima) and ISP plant 
(Hachinohe) were established under joint venture. Table 3.2 
shows the ownership relation of these "joint refineries."
All ores required were supplied by the owners in accordance 
with the equity shares. Both smelters hre operated on a toll 
basis for the owners on an agreed basis of consignment. The
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Table 3.1
Japanese Zinc Smelting Capacity, 1987 









Distillation and ISP Plants 
Mikkaichi Nippon 12 0
Hachinohe(ISP)* Hachinohe 84
Harima (ISP) Sumitomo 79
Note: * Joint refineries.












Source: Mineral Industry Handbook, 1989, ANRE, Tokyo.
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Table 3.2
Ownership Relation of Iijima and 
Hachinihe Refineries 
(in %)
Akita Smelting, Co. Hachinohe Smelting, Co.









Note: *Nisso Smelting, Co.
Source: Compiled from The World Zinc industry. Gupta, 1982, 
p. 71-73.
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purpose of this approach was to construct internationally 
competitive refineries of the largest possible scale, 
sharing initial costs among the owners. This approach 
allowed the owners (1) to share the scale merits, (2) to 
share related risks to the projects, and (3) to expand their 
own capacity on a more economic basis. These two joint 
refineries are highly competitive with refineries in 
industrialized countries even today, as we will see in 
Chapter 4.
Zinc refineries in Japan were originally located far 
inland near zinc mines. As dependency on the imported 
concentrate increased after 1950, the refineries were built 
in coastal areas, close to deepwater ports with berths for 
large-ocean going vessels. This location has several 
advantages. First, access to inexpensive marine 
transportation makes shipment of concentrates from abroad 
feasible. Because concentrate suppliers generally bear the 
transportation costs from mills to smelters, they benefit 
from inexpensive transportation. Terms of contracts then 
become more favorable for the smelters; in negotiations, the 
smelters can request higher treatment charges. Second, 
because smelters bear the costs from refinery to users, a 
port location reduces those costs. It is worthwhile to note 
that major slab zinc users, such as the Japanese steel
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plants and the users of byproducts, are located nearby or 
are easily reached by sea.
By 1972 when Japan became the world's largest zinc- 
producing country, Japanese zinc producers already had in 
place modern, well-planned plants with large zinc smelting 
capacities mainly located in coastal areas. The fast-paced 
capacity expansion continued until 1975 with capacity 
exceeding one million tons (Figure 3.1).
Besides the cost reduction efforts, other favorable 
conditions for the growth of Japanese smelters existed. 
First, in the latter half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, 
world zinc markets were generally tight. Against 
expectation, imports of slab zinc did not increase after 
trade liberalization. More important, the Japanese smelters 
began to expand their export business.
Second, Japanese smelters could take full advantage of 
their prime location; Japanese industries were the most 
rapidly growing zinc market in the world. As a result, 
despite the fast capacity expansion, utilization was 
generally high (Figure 3.2). This is, of course, a necessary 
condition for economies of scale and lower production costs. 
In addition, main direct users, such as Japanese steel and 
automotive producers, were quite competitive in the 
international marketplace, giving zinc producers a stable 

















































Source: Mining Industry Handbook. 1989, ANRE, Tokyo.
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Third, the domestic market for sulfuric acid, one of
the major byproducts of zinc smelting, was huge and growing
(Figure 3.3). Sulfuric acid is used mainly by fertilizer and
synthetic fiber producers. The Japanese primary zinc
producers, thus, had a stable outlet for the byproduct,
whose users were also located close to the refineries.
To summarize, the Japanese primary zinc producers had
created competitive zinc smelting capacity, and thanks to
the rapidly growing domestic market, Japan became the
world's largest zinc-producing country. Moreover, by 1974,
Japanese zinc metal exports represented a substantial
portion of the total metal traded among the market economy
countries. According to Gupta (1982, p. 23), Japan supplied
18% of the zinc metal traded among market economy countries
in 1974. Only Canada supplied more, 29% (excluding intra-
European trade). The author says,
Besides Japan, the major suppliers of metal in the 
world market are Australia, Canada, Mexico, and 
Peru, constituting approximately 60 percent of the 
metal marketed (excluding intra-European trade).
This is in contrast to their share of about 85 
percent in 1960. The decline in their share has 
mainly been gained by Japanese smelters.
This may indicate that the Japanese smelters had become
























FISCAL YEAR  
DOM ESTIC DEM AND SMELTER PRODUCTION
Figure 3.3
Sulfuric Acid
Note: Production of sulfuric acid is from copper, lead, and 
zinc smelters.
Source: Yearbook of Minina. Nonferrous Metals, and Product 
Statistics. various years, MITI, Tokyo.
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3.3 Industrial Policy
After trade liberalization, Japanese zinc producers 
modernized and expanded smelters operations, moving quickly 
to an internationally competitive position. How, then, did 
government policy influence the behavior and competitiveness 
of the smelter operations? Did government play a central 
role? To what degree were the policies effective? Did 
policies always promote and favor to the smelters 
operations? This section tries to answer these questions.
3.3.1 Japanese Industrial Policy Goals
During the "rapid growth era" of Japanese zinc 
production and the Japanese economy as a whole, the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) did not pay 
special attention to the zinc industry. That does not mean 
that MITI did not intervene in the activities of zinc 
producers. Instead, it means that MITI's intervention was 
carried out within the context of overall industrial policy.
Before surveying how MITI intervened in the activities 
of the zinc smelting industry, let us briefly outline the 
goals of Japanese industrial policy after trade 
liberalization. For this purpose, it is convenient to divide 
the 1964 to 1973 era into two subperiods: from 1964 to 1969, 
and from 1970 to 1973. The division is made because the
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goals of Japan's industrial policy changed substantially 
after 1970.
In the first subperiod, industrial policy sought to 
carry out in a progressive fashion trade and capital 
liberalization, and, at the same time, take care that 
liberalization did not damage to certain industries. When 
quality of goods or the competitive strength of industries 
was in question, liberalization was softened and delayed 
until it was certain that the industries would be 
competitive with those of foreign countries. The government 
revised the tariff system, raising some tariffs arid changing 
others from a value to a quantity basis, introducing an 
emergency tariff system, a tariff-quota system, and other 
protectionist tariff measures as a response to 
liberalization. In addition, while Japan joined the OECD in 
1964, it did not begin to liberalize capital transactions 
until 1967, and it did not complete capital liberalization 
until 1973. Industrial policy, on the other hand, sought an 
industrial system that could survive liberalization. The 
theme of building a new industrial system was centered on 
the problem of modernizing and strengthening the 
international competitiveness of Japanese industry overall, 
from large corporations to small-scale enterprises. MITI's 
attempts carried out in this period might be summarized in 
two aspects.
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First, while the transition to an open market economy 
shook the relations between government and private sector, 
MITI attempted to maintain the power of the government to 
intervene in the private sector. MITI did not believe that 
Japanese industries, especially strategic "heavy and 
chemical" industries, would become internationally 
competitive without its intervention. They assumed that the 
heavy and chemical industries, which were the anticipated 
sources of Japanese economic growth, did not have 
comparative advantage, and that if Japan liberalized trade 
without government intervention, Japanese industrial 
structure would be specialized in labor intensive or "light" 
industries. So, the idea of a new industrial system emerged 
in the first place as a system of cooperation between 
private sector and government, in which the government could 
affect prices, investment, output quantities, and other 
variables better determined endogenously in the market. The 
effort was, however, set back by the unexpected failure of 
the Diet to enact legislation on the Special Industries Law 
which was designed to implement the cooperation system in 
which the bureaucracy would have powers to intervene in 
private decision making (1962-64). As a result, MITI lost 
the legal basis of its intervention, and its influence on 
the private sector became substantially limited.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of legal authority, MITI tried
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to intervene to various stages of industrial activities with 
"administrative guidance." In general, industrial policy 
changed from being direct, powerful, and statutory to being 
indicative, guiding, and consensual.
Second, another essential of MITI's attempt was the 
reorganization and consolidation of industries. In the face 
of liberalization, MITI assumed, and this notion was also 
widely accepted by industries, that Japanese industries were 
less competitive relative to their foreign counterparts 
because of the insufficient scale of firms and productive 
capacities. This was, then, assumed to be caused by 
excessive or cutthroat competition by a relatively large 
number of firms in an industry. Thus, from MITI's 
standpoint, policies to reduce the number of firms or to 
concentrate production through promoting mergers, tie-ups, 
and the coordination of facilities investment among firms 
were thought to eliminate these perceived defects of 
Japanese industries. MITI's belief that the larger the firm 
size, the better the competitive position relative to 
foreign firms was not specific in Japan. At that time, this 
sort of thinking was found also in Western Europe, where 
there was direct competition with U.S.-based, large-scaled 
firms. MITI's attempt to promote the rationalization of 
major industries partly resulted in the large-scale mergers 
undertaken in the latter half of 1960s and the early 1970s.
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For example, the merger between Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel 
into Japan Steel in 1970 generated the world's second 
largest steel producer.
If one claims to believe in the effectiveness of 
resource allocation through the price system, there is no 
room for this sort of policy approach. Government 
intervention is limited to cases of market failure, and 
government has an important role to play, not in bringing 
about industrial restructuring, that is, greater 
concentration, but rather in the maintenance of the 
competitive base of the economy through procompetition 
policies. In understanding the political thinking at that 
time, it is necessary to remember that there was no 
recognition of the importance of antimonopoly policy. The 
Antimonopoly Law had been imported into Japan in 1947, but 
in the process of postwar industrialization it took a 
subordinate role to industrial policy, and there was 
virtually no debate about the importance of antimonopoly 
policy from the standpoint of economic welfare (Tsuruta, 
1982, p. 149).
In the second subperiod 1970-1973, the goals of 
industrial policy changed substantially from a growth- 
oriented policy to a policy that took advantage of growth. 
The public consensus began to shift from the single-minded 
pursuit of economic growth to a demand for a solution to the
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problems that accompanied growth, especially pollution, 
destruction of the environment, overcrowded urban and 
depopulated countryside, and the like. In response, the 
Industry Structure Council (ICS) , a MITT arm to form general 
industrial policies, presented a report, MITI Policy in 
1970s, in May 1970. The report set forth three goals for 
industrial policy in the 1970s (ICS, 1971). First, 
industrial policies should use the ability of the Japanese 
economy to improve environment, to strengthen education, to 
increase investment in research and development, and to 
increase foreign aid. Second was the theme of using the 
market mechanism to the fullest possible extent. In other 
words, it emphasized that excess policy intervention and 
measures which excessively protect industry should be 
strictly prohibited. Finally, it was suggested that the 
industrial structure would shift from capital-intensive 
heavy industries to knowledge-intensive machining and 
assembly industries. The viewpoint expressed in the report 
has governed industrial policy since (Uekusa, 1988, p. 97).
In sum, in the first subperiod, 1964-1969, two policy 
goals responded to trade and capital liberalization. One 
protected industries with tariffs and with delayed 
liberalization of foreign direct investment. The other 
strengthened the international competitiveness of industries 
through positive government intervention and encouraged the
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enhancement of firm size and the concentration of 
production. In the second subperiod, 1970-1973, however, the 
focus of industrial policy moved to the improvement of 
socioeconomic performance. And, more important, policy 
shifted from government intervention to utilization of the 
market system.
3.3.2 Strengthening International Competitiveness
With respect to the zinc industry, there were also 
protectionist measures. Direct investment of foreign 
smelters to Japan was gradually liberalized and completed in 
August 1971. MITI's concern was the fear of domination of 
the domestic market by the multinational firms of the United 
States and Europe. A tariff system was also introduced 
against imported metallic zinc in 1964. Although these 
protectionist policy measures might have played a certain 
role in the development of zinc smelters, it is difficult to 
say whether the Japanese zinc industry grew rapidly and 
gained the competitiveness because of these protectionist 
measures. The tariff system, especially (analyzed in Chapter 
4), might not have been all that effective in protecting 
domestic zinc smelters in this period because the tariff was 
designed to protect domestic mines which had high production 
costs. Further, MITI's focus was not on the protection of 
the zinc producers, but on the promotion of rationalization
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of the industry, expressed in the Temporary Measures Law 
discussed earlier.
MITI's direct intervention in the latter half of 1960s 
was, thus, aimed to strengthen the international 
competitiveness of zinc smelters. MITI assumed that the 
Japanese nonferrous metals industry was less competitive, 
chiefly because there were too many small-sized firms. 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of MITI, the 
rationalization or modernization of the industry primarily 
meant reducing the number of firms and the enlarging their 
scale and productive capacities. However, it was difficult 
for MITI to convince producers to merge because the 
interests, traditions, and strategies of each company were 
substantially different. Alternatively, MITI sought to 
concentrate zinc metal production through cooperation among 
firms. This was expected to mitigate their "excessive" 
competition. The joint venture approach to construct large- 
scale was, thus, supposed to be a necessary and appropriate 
strategy. The two joint refineries discussed earlier were 
constructed based on the MITI's administrative guidance.
On the other hand, the Japanese zinc producers competed 
intensely to enlarge their own plants. Generally in the 
commodity business, the absence of product differentiation 
means that firms' sales are closely tied to the amount and 
efficiency of a firm's capacity because the production cost
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is the most important factor in competition. Thus, firms are 
under great pressure to have large and modern plants to 
achieve their target market share. The main reason for the 
Japanese producers' aggressive stance in facility investment 
was that the expected growth rate of the domestic demand for 
zinc was extremely high and there was a great possibility 
that market share would be lost if investment were not made. 
Yet, as Porter (1980, P. 324) pointed out, the decision to 
expand capacity should be based not only on the expectation 
about future demand, but also on the behavior of 
competitors.
Accurate expectations about competitor's behavior 
is essential as well, because if too many 
competitors add capacity, no firms is likely to 
escape the adverse consequences. Thus, capacity 
expansion involves all the classic problems of 
oligopoly, in which firms are mutually dependent.
The "adverse consequence" refers primarily to the
development of excess capacity. MITI was afraid that intense
competition in facility investment would soon cause the
problem of excess capacity. Although the Japanese market for
zinc had been growing since the 1950s, MITI believed that
the growth would stop some day and demand would be more
cyclical than expanding. In such a case, the excess capacity
would significantly worsen competitiveness. MITI supposed,
therefore, that if a power outside the market could
coordinate the pace of investment of competing firms, the
B irm ro  la k e s  lilh a k y  
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problem of excess capacity could be avoided. MITI has 
supervised the investment activities of producers since 
around the mid-1960s.
One should note that MITI's intervention was not backed 
by specific legislation. The Temporary Measures Law did not 
prescribe the authority of MITI control over zinc smelters. 
Instead, interventions were carried out in the form of 
administrative guidance. The effectiveness of administrative 
guidance is closely related to the policy formation process. 
To the extent that such guidance did not have coercive 
authority, government goals in the end could only be 
achieved through persuasion. In other words, obedience was 
voluntary.
A unique feature of the Japanese policy formation 
process is the "policy council system." All important 
policies are first discussed in a policy council, generally 
made up of former bureaucrats, journalists, professors, and 
representatives of private firms. The council is responsible 
for sending formal reports to the responsible minister, and 
in some cases for forging its ideas into law. The Mining 
Industry Council was formed for the nonferrous metals 
industry in April 1962. The Temporary Measures Law was 
enacted based on the council's report compiled in September 
1962 .
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An important function of a council is the formation of
a consensus about industrial policies based on the exchange
of information between the government and the private
sectors. Japanese industrial policy has always been formed
based on the broad consensus of public and private sectors
when the government lacks legal authority. Whenever MITI's
guidance is based on such consensus, the guidance, in
general, is followed. Eventually, the construction of the
joint refineries was undertaken based on consensus between
MITI and the producers. On such occasions, intervention is
not coercive control by the government, because the policy
is regarded as a product of cooperation between industry and
government. Wang, an American supervisory physical
scientist, reported an example which represents the
limitation of MITI's guidance, when the expectations of MITI
and the zinc producers were keenly divided. In 1965,
domestic demand for zinc was relatively weak and the Mining
Industry Council provided a pessimistic projection of the
future growth of domestic market.
To head off problems that could result from excess 
capacity, the MITI urged zinc smelting firms to 
curtail their expansion plans drastically but the 
zinc smelters disagreed with MITI's 
recommendation. While they did not question the 
projections as drawn up by the Mining Industry 
Council, they reportedly believed that the 
international market could absorb any excess zinc 
Japan might produce (Wang, 1965, p. 1148).
T—3 887 46
The producers continued capacity expansion despite the 
MITI's warning, a illustration of guidance not followed.
Meanwhile, it is well known that especially through 
1950s and 1960s, the Japanese government devised a 
complicated system of policies to promote industrial 
development and cooperated closely for this purpose with 
private firms. The activities of the government are, 
however, sometimes overestimated in assessing success of 
Japanese industries. In case of the zinc smelters, MITI's 
guidance did not play a central role in the creation of a 
competitive industry. MITI's contribution was limited to 
providing the producers with plans on how to become 
competitive. In other words, what can be favorably evaluated 
in MITI's activities is the guidance to construct the large- 
scale, jointly owned, and competitive refineries.
It is worthy to note that although MITI attempted to 
mitigate the excessive competition through coordinating 
producer investment activities to strengthen international 
competitiveness of the industry, the zinc producers were 
motivated to be competitive not by the MITI's indicative 
intervention, but by the intense competition among the 
producers. As MITI pointed out, the number of nonferrous 
base metals producers in Japan was larger than in any other 
industrialized country. As of 1974, for instance, seven 
companies were producing zinc metal in Japan, but six
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corporate groups controlled the entire zinc smelting 
capacity in the United States, and five corporate groups 
controlled about 8 0% of the total European zinc plant 
capacity (Gupta, 1982, p. 55-59).
After all, the abrupt capacity expansion resulted in 
huge excess capacity after the oil crisis despite MITI's 
supervision. It is easy to say that this was caused because 
MITI and the producers could not foresee the oil crisis. 
However, when we note that capacity was added even after the 
first oil crisis, despite MITI's deliberate stance against 
the capacity expansion, it appears that excess capacity was 
a result of the producers' race to have large, efficient, 
and competitive refineries.
The major force that made the Japanese smelters 
competitive was, thus, the "excessive" competition which 
MITI assumed was the weakness of the industry. In this 
regard, MITI's contribution to the creation of the smelters' 
competitiveness seems quite marginal.
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3.3.3 Pollution Regulation
The first environmental pollution problem in Japan 
dates to the late nineteenth century. It was not until the 
late 1960s that pollution came under severe public 
criticism. Fujimura (1981, p. 361-62) pointed out that the 
major cause of the pollution explosion in the late 1960s was 
the extremely high pace of the nation's economic growth. 
Productivity and profit were the highest priorities, the 
welfare of society was completely neglected.
In the zinc industry, discharged cadmium and sulfur 
dioxide became the major issues. Cadmium toxicosis caused by 
the waste water from the Kamioka refinery of Mitsui Mining 
and Smelting caused deaths of more than one hundred persons. 
This incident remains one of the four worst pollution 
disasters in modern Japanese history.
In 1970, the Japanese Diet enacted a series of anti­
pollution laws and established the Environment Agency in 
1971 to administer overall pollution control policies. MITI 
also established the Industrial Location and Environmental 
Bureau inside the ministry and responded positively to 
pollution problems. For instance, domestic slab zinc 
production decreased in fiscal 1970 primarily because two 
large plants— Annaka refinery of Toho Zinc and Mikkaichi of 
Nippon Mining— decreased their output by about 4 0% because
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of MITI's restriction backed by public reaction to alleged 
pollution by cadmium and sulfur dioxide.
Environmental regulation also advanced in other 
industrialized countries around 1970 causing severe problems 
for zinc smelters. In the United States, many plants closed 
primarily because of their inability to meet pollution 
restrictions. The closures contributed to the United States 
becoming the largest importer of zinc metal in the world.
For Japanese smelters, regulations were also a 
difficult problem. They had to meet the world's most 
stringent requirements because of their location. The 
smelters operate in close proximity to industrial and 
residential areas where excessive pollution cannot be 
tolerated. And emissions must be controlled to protect ocean 
fisheries a major source of income for people living near 
the refineries. The reason Japanese producers did not close 
their refineries might be that most of the Japanese 
refineries were quite new at that time. Some refineries had 
already adopted pollution-handling facilities and met the 
requirements. For others, it was more economic to adopt 
anti-pollution measures than to shut down. Also, the 
government provided low-interest loans to promote the 
producers investment in anti-pollution measures.
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Table 3.3 shows the total investment in Japanese 
copper, lead, and zinc mines and refineries and the 
proportion devoted to anti-pollution measures. In the first 
half of the 1970s, while the producers were still expanding 
their productive capacity, almost one-fourth of the total 
investment was devoted to pollution control. Needless to 
say, this investment added nothing to profits. Instead, it 
became a cost-push factor. The producers major source of 
funds at that time was bank borrowing. Thus, the investment 
in pollution control increased the burden of interest 
expense. Pollution control also increased operating costs, 
such as labor and energy. These cost-push factors became 
even more onerous after the oil crisis because the 
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AFTER THE OIL CRISIS
4.1 Economic Adversity
Since late 1973, in addition to the burden of anti­
pollution regulations, the major events adversely affecting 
Japanese primary zinc producers were the oil crises and the 
steep appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar. 
Because the effects of these events were so severe, the 
period might be called "hard times" in contrast to the 
previous "golden age." This section examines how these 
events affected producers and the difficulties they 
encountered.
4.1.1 The Oil Crises
With the outbreak of the fourth Middle East conflict in 
October 1973, the oil-producing countries adopted embargoes 
on petroleum exports, resulting in the first oil 
crisis. The Japanese economy suffered severe inflation, a 
sharp drop in economic growth, and a shift to a large 
balance-of-payment deficit. The government reacted to 
restrain aggregate demand in order to stop inflation, and 
the economy fell into a severe recession in 1974 and 1975. 
The domestic demand for zinc declined considerably. As a
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consequence, two problems arose for zinc smelters: excess- 
inventory and an increase in production costs.
The excess-inventory problem actually began in 197 0 
because of the relatively low growth rate of the domestic 
zinc market. The growth rate of fiscal 1969 was 12.4% over 
1968? the rates for 197 0 and 1971 were 0.9% and 4.8%. The 
Japanese smelters imported a fair amount of zinc concentrate 
mainly from Australia, Canada, Mexico, and Peru. The long­
term contracts with foreign raw material suppliers initiated 
in the latter half of 1960s when the domestic market for 
zinc was growing rapidly resulted in oversupplies of zinc 
ore and concentrates in the early 197 0s when demand 
weakened. Demand recovered about midyear 1972 and the 
inventory problem eased somewhat. Then came the oil crisis. 
This was the first time since 1950 that Japanese smelters 
experienced a decline in domestic demand for zinc. The slab 
zinc inventory jumped from 97,000 metric tons in fiscal 1972 
to 101,000 tons in 1973, and exceeded 200,000 tons in 1974 
(Table 4.1).
Japanese smelters began to renegotiate with their 
foreign concentrate suppliers to reduce shipments because 
they had to cut back production. At the renegotiations, 
however, some international friction arose. Some raw 
material suppliers, especially Peru and Mexico, 
offered stubborn resistance to the substantial reduction
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Table 4•1
Zinc Inventory and Public Stockpiles 
(in metric tons)
Slab Zinc Ratio Public Ratio
Fiscal Inventory Production (A)/(B) Stockpile (C)/(B)
Year (A) (B) (%) (C) (%)
1969 72,898 719,723 10.1 0 0.0
1970 92,379 675,607 13 .7 0 0.0
1971 100,498 731,996 13.7 0 0.0
1972 97,020 835,282 11. 6 0 0.0
1973 100,896 829,454 12.2 0 0.0
1974 201,050 823,076 24.4 0 0.0
1975 253,494 695,399 36.5 0 0.0
1976 229,985 770,061 29.9 12,000 1.6
1977 129,928 768,673 16.9 135,720 17.7
1978 115,957 774,464 15. 0 144,720 18.7
1979 128,421 786,460 16. 3 137,720 17.5
1980 141,983 708,824 20.0 115,720 16. 3
1981 116,383 666,294 17.5 82,630 12.4
1982 94,460 671,530 14. 1 57,903 8.6
1983 97,651 726,305 13.4 0 0.0
Note: The balances of inventory and public stockpile are 
year-end base. The inventory includes all the 
producers', users', and distributors' inventories, 
excluding public stockpile.
Source: Bulletin of Japan Mining Industry Association. 1978 
and 1989, JMIA, Tokyo.
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of exports. Japan was Peru's largest single buyer of zinc 
concentrate. In 1974, for example, Peru exported 318,000 
tons of zinc concentrate (in zinc content basis), of which
135,000 tons or 42.5% was exported to Japan. Further, zinc 
was one of Peru's most important export commodities, an 
important component of its national budget. Because of this, 
and in consideration of the large inventory held by the 
Japanese zinc producers, the Japanese government initiated a 
stockpiling program in 197 6.
The extremely large inventory caused a financial 
problem for Japanese zinc producers. Increasing production 
costs accelerated this problem. The cost increases were 
brought about primarily by low operating capacity and the 
sharp rise in energy prices, especially electricity.
Japan's electricity prices were high relative to other 
industrialized countries even before the oil crises. High 
electricity prices reflected Japan's reliance on oil, 99% of 
which was imported. With the oil crises, the price of 
electricity skyrocketed. Table 4.2 shows the changes in 
annual average electricity prices paid by Japanese 
nonferrous metals producers from fiscal 1973 to 1977. 
Electricity rates were revised three times: September 1973, 
June 1974, and June 197 6. As indicated, the average price 
increased by 139% over four years and was considerably 
higher than prices paid by European zinc smelters in 1978.
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Table 4.2
Electricity Prices in Japan, and 



















Note: Japanese electricity prices are the average prices
paid by eight major nonferrous metals producers. The 
prices in other countries are the average prices paid 
by zinc smelters.
Source: Bulletin of Japan Minina Industry Association. 1989, 
J MIA, Tokyo.
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In 1980, the price rose again by about 58% because of the 
second oil crisis following the Iranian Revolution of April 
1979. Approximately 60% of Japanese zinc smelting capacity 
consisted of electrolysis zinc reduction plants. And the 
high electricity prices affected those plants the most.
Another Japanese industry, primary aluminium, was 
substantially depressed by the high electricity prices. 
Aluminium smelting is one of the most electricity-intensive 
industrial processes. The price of electricity is the 
critical factor in the international competitiveness of 
smelters. The Japanese zinc smelters escaped the drastic 
depression of the aluminium smelters, mainly because of the 
difference in the unit consumption of electricity. About
15,000 kilowatt hours of electricity is currently required 
for each metric ton of aluminium produced, but for zinc, the 
figure is around 4,000 kwh per ton. The pressure of high 
electricity prices was less for zinc smelters than for 
aluminium smelters. Nevertheless, since 1980, it is said in 
Japan that "after aluminum comes zinc" because of the steep 
appreciation of Japanese yen.
4.1.2 The Appreciation of Yen
After 1977, the Japanese yen appreciated sharply 
against U.S. dollar. The exchange rate had been pegged at 
3 60 yen per one U.S. dollar after World War II and had
H*THU» LAKES LI*h * t \ x  
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remained at that level until the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in February 1973 which marked the shift to a 
floating foreign exchange rate by Japan and other major 
countries. Figure 4.1 shows the change in the quarterly 
averaged yen/dollar exchange rates after 1973. The exchange 
rates are expressed by index form setting the average 
exchange rate of the first quarter of 1973 equal to 100.
The higher the figure the weaker the yen, and conversely, 
the lower the figure the stronger the yen against 
the U.S. dollar. An apparent trend of the appreciation of 
the yen (downward slope of the curve), especially during 
1977-1978 and after 1985, can be seen in the illustration.
Meanwhile, in 197 6, the European Producer Price (EPP) 
changed to a U.S. dollar basis from a pound sterling basis. 
The change in the exchange rate between U.S. dollar and 
Japanese yen, has affected Japanese zinc producers directly 
since then. One might think that the appreciation of the yen 
would be favorable for Japanese zinc producers because the 
yen-based import price of zinc concentrate would be less. 
This was not the case. The appreciation eventually and 
significantly damaged Japanese zinc producers. To understand 
this, the effect of the appreciation must be examined in two 
ways: the effect on domestic prices and the effect on the 
profitability of the smelters. The appreciation was harmful 
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Figure 4.1
Change in Yen/$U\S. Exchange Rate
Source: Economic White Paper, 1988, Economic Planning 
Agency, Tokyo.
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well. As noted in Chapter 2, domestic zinc prices have been 
determined based on the Japanese yen-based EPP. This means 
that, even if the dollar-based EPP does not change, the 
Japanese domestic prices decline when the Japanese yen is 
strengthened. Table 4.3 reveals the change in the EPP and 
the Japanese distilled zinc prices from 1976 through 1987. 
During 1977 and 1978, the EPP declined on account of the 
worldwide over-supply of slab zinc. According to the index 
shown in Table 4.3, the EPP declined by 9.5% in 1977 over 
1976 and 24.6% in 1978 over 1976. In contrast, the Japanese 
price declined by 11.9% in 1977 and by 38.3% in 1978. When 
the second sharp appreciation occurred after 1985, the 
difference became more apparent. While the average EPP in 
1987 was higher than in 197 6, the Japanese price of 1987 was 
less than two-thirds of the price in 197 6. In general, the 
exchange rates have adversely affected domestic price since 
1977, and have substantially reduced producer revenues.
In terms of profitability, the effect of appreciation 
can be interpreted in detail as follows. The main source of 
a smelter revenue is the treatment charge. The treatment 
charge covers all processing costs from concentrates through 
to refined metal and smelter profit margins, quoted in U.S. 
dollars and relatively fixed worldwide. Appreciation of the 
local currency against the U.S. dollar thus reduces the 
revenue from treatment charge. On the other hand, the
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Table 4.3
Effect of Appreciation of Yen 















1976 795.0 100. 0 247.0 100. 0
1977 719.2 90.5 217.5 88.1
1978 607.2 76.4 152.4 61.7
1979 792 .9 99.7 189.8 76.8
1980 798.2 100 . 4 206. 4 83 . 6
1981 915.4 115. 1 230.4 93.3
1982 847.8 106.6 238.5 96. 6
1983 825.0 103.8 224.3 90. 8
1984 1,001.2 125.9 262.8 106. 4
1985 845.9 106 . 4 235.6 95 . 4
1986 800.8 100.7 164.0 66.4
1987 823.3 103 . 6 148.8 60.2
Note: Japanese distilled zinc price was a category of
Japanese producer prices quoted for 98% pure zinc 
metal.
Source: Minina Industry Handbook, 1989, ANRE, Tokyo.
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processing costs are quoted in the local currency, and do 
not change in the case of appreciation. Since the profit is 
calculated by subtracting processing costs from the 
treatment charge, the appreciation worsens the profitability 
of smelters. Eventually, in fiscal 1977 when the steep 
appreciation started, Mitsui, the nation's largest producer 
of zinc, suffered the largest deficit, 4.6 billion yen. Toho 
Zinc, whose main product has been zinc, had a deficit of 2.8 
billion yen followed by Sumitomo, 2.2 billion yen, and Dowa,
1.2 billion yen.
The appreciation after 1985 also worsened the 
profitability of smelters. And this was more significant 
than the 1977-1978 case. A result of the appreciation can 
be seen in the capacity, reduction (see Figure 3.1). While 
the producers have suffered from the low operating ratio of 
their capacity since the oil crisis, the domestic capacity 
remained at about 1 million tons until 1984. After 1985
154,000 tons of capacity were closed, a result of the 
producers' effort to close unprofitable refineries and to 




With the deterioration of competitiveness, MITI's 
stance changed. This section examines the purposes, 
characteristics, and effects of two policy measures: (1)
stockpiling, initiated in 1976; and (2) the tariff system, 
effective since 1964.
4.2.1 Stockpiling
Public stockpiles are commonly created to cope with the 
possibility of war or hostile behavior by outside major 
producers. For example, stockpile programs for zinc in the 
United States and France were established for military and 
strategic purposes. The purpose of Japanese zinc stockpiling 
system was quite different.
The idea for a stockpile program was already in the 
Mining Industry Council's report of June 1972. The over 
supply of zinc concentrate and the friction between Japanese 
producers and concentrate producers had already emerged. The 
council's concern in the report was primarily a fear of 
anticipated international, political problems with mineral- 
producing countries, which might have surfaced had the 
Japanese producers substantially and one-sidedly reduced 
imports. Japan was already a fairly large importer, 
contributing substantially to the economic development of 
some exporters. From the standpoint of international
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economic cooperation, the council assumed the Japanese 
government was responsible for smoothing mineral imports 
because the private sector with its large inventories could 
not do so (ANRE, 1973, p. 198-207). The stated rationale for 
the stockpile program by the council was therefore political 
rather than economic. Whatever the rationale, the actual 
stockpile program started in fiscal 1976 and functioned as a 
temporary measure to help the Japanese producers who were 
holding large inventories.
The major difficulty for the producers was financial. 
The estimated money required to finance the excess inventory 
of imported zinc concentrate for fiscal 1972 was 13 billion 
yen or 43 million U.S. dollars. While the estimated 
consumption of imported zinc concentrate for fiscal 1972 was
442.000 metric tons, the estimated excess inventory (or 
inventory beyond the standard) at the end of the year was
190.000 tons. Since producers were also suffering from 
excess inventories of copper, lead, nickel, and other 
nonferrous metals, it was impossible for them to finance the 
excess inventory unless they could drastically cut imports.
In fiscal 1972, accordingly, the government's reaction 
took the form of financial assistance through loans provided 
by Export-Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ), a quasi-governmental 
financial institution. Producers had always borrowed from 
the EIBJ as well as from private banks to import
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concentrates. Normally these loans had to be repaid in about 
three months, the time it took to smelt and sell the 
imported concentrates. When smelters could no longer sell 
the imported concentrate within the time period, the 
government gave the producers a two years' grace period.
With respect to zinc, then, about 22 million U.S. dollars 
were financed by the EIBJ for two years, fiscal 1972 and 
1973.
The government established the Metal Stockpile 
Foundation in July 197 6 to handle thef excess supply of base 
metals caused by the first oil crisis. Figure 4.2 shows the 
basic scheme of the stockpiling program. Funds for 
stockpiling were borrowed by Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
(MMAJ) from banks with the guarantees of the government or 
the producers. The government also bore a portion of 
interest payment when the funds were loaned by MMAJ to the 
Metal Stockpile Foundation. This allowed the Foundation to 
incur low interest expenses. The direct object of the 
stockpile was not imported concentrate but metallic zinc and 
copper produced in Japan. The commodities were purchased at 
the market price and sold at the lower of either (1) market 
price, or (2) the acquisition price plus storage costs paid 
by the Foundation. The Foundation purchased zinc from fiscal 
1976 to 1978, and released from 1979 to 1983 to the smelters 
and the metal users (Table 4.4).
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G o v e r n m e n t
G u a r a n t e e s
 ________
P r i v a t e  B a n k s
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A c q u i s i  t i o n R e l e a s e
P r i m a r y  Z i n c  P r o d u c e r s ,  
a n d  U s e r s
Figure 4.2
Scheme of Japanese Stockpiling System
Source: Mining Industry Handbook, 1989, ANRE, Tokyo.
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Table 4.4
















1976 12,000 2, 999 0 171,941 1.7
1977 123,720 22,812 0 153,522 14.9
1978 9, 000 1, 368 0 112,711 1.2
1979 0 0 7, 000 143,290 0.0
1980 0 0 22,000 130,472 0.0
1981 0 0 33,090 156,883 0.0
1982 0 0 24,727 154,285 0.0
1983 0 0 57,903 177,473 0.0
Source: Bulletin of Japan Mining Industry Association. 1978 
and 1989, JMIA, Tokyo.
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The primary effect of stockpiling on the producers
was the same as government loans, namely a kind of financial
assistance. The producers could sell a part of their excess
inventory to the government and save the expense of
maintaining unwanted inventories. More than this, they
benefitted from sales for which there was no real market. In
fiscal 1977, producer sales to the Stockpile Agency amounted
to about 15% of their total zinc sales. This helped reduce
their deficit that year. Another advantage was that,
although the system was called “Import Stabilization
«
Stockpiling System,11 the direct object of the stockpile was 
metallic zinc, not imported zinc concentrate. This allowed 
the smelters to keep their capacity utilization rate 
relatively high. High utilization meant lower processing 
costs. For the producers the stockpiling system provided 
short-term relief from the huge demand-supply gap.
Did the Japanese stockpile then play the role of a 
buffer stock in the domestic market? A buffer stock is a 
public stockpile whose purpose is the adjustment of the 
demand-supply gap to reduce price volatility. The answer is 
probably no, for the effect of Japanese stockpiling on zinc 
prices was negligible. As noted in Chapter 2, domestic zinc 
prices are determined by the European Producer Price. This 
means that domestic zinc prices are neither competitive 
market prices determined by the Japanese market conditions
asnro* l a z s b libraryCOLOKfffiDO 3CTO0r “ ,;
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nor producer prices determined by the Japanese producers.
Japanese zinc producers are not price makers but price
takers. Therefore, while the government acquisition of the
commodity increased the total domestic demand for zinc, the
price did not change. In the release phase of stockpile, the
result was the same.
One might argue, however, that if zinc prices are
determined basically by the demand-supply relation in the
world zinc market, of which the Japanese market is a large
component, it is possible that the Japanese stockpile
affected zinc prices. Certainly, producer prices have been
determined partly on an basis of the LME price as a guide.
The LME price is a competitive price. Yet, there is some
questions whether the world zinc market can be regarded as a
competitive market. Tilton (1985, p. 395-96) distinguished
producer markets from competitive markets as follows:
Firms in producer markets quote the price at which 
they are prepared to sell their product. These 
markets, normally characterized by a few major 
sellers, have relatively stable prices, though 
when demand is weak, actual prices may fall below 
quoted producer prices as a result of discounting 
and other concessions. ... In competitive markets, 
price is determined by the interplay of supply and 
demand, and is free to fluctuate as much as 
necessary to clear the marketplace. Many buyers 
and sellers are typically active in competitive 
markets, and price is often set on a commodity 
exchange.
Based on the above discussion, the world zinc market had
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been (until the EPP was abolished) closer to a producer 
market than to a competitive market: the small number of 
suppliers, the existence of stable producer prices, and the 
like. Therefore, Japanese stockpiling probably did not 
affect world zinc prices.
Even if we suppose the world zinc market is a sort of 
competitive market, the effect of the stockpile on prices 
was presumably negligible. First, the acquisition and 
release of the stockpile was completed within the domestic 
market. The Japanese market is almost independent from the 
outside market in terms of demand and supply relations. 
Second, the scale of the stockpile was small. Slab zinc 
consumption in the market economy countries was roughly 4.5 
million metric tons at that time. On the other hand, the 
peak amount of the acquisition of Japanese stockpile was 
0.12 million tons. That of release was a mere 0.06 million 
tons. Third, the short-run supply curve for most metals is 
supposed to be elastic to prices when the amount output is 
far lower than the capacity constraint. In other words, the 
slope of the supply curve is supposed to be quite mild. 
Since the oil crisis, the zinc industry in the market 
economy countries has suffered from considerable excess 
capacity. This means the demand for zinc has been far less 
than capacity. During such occasions, even if the demand
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curve increases slightly because of stockpiling, the 
increase in market prices will be negligible.
Finally, the stockpile system did not protect the 
Japanese zinc smelters from foreign competition. Stockpiling 
was not a protectionist measure. The reason is quite simple. 
The policy did not restrict imports. Instead, from the 
standpoint of the Japanese producers, it worked as an 
assistance policy for the reasons stated above.
4.2.2 Tariff Analysis
The Japanese tariff system was introduced in 1964, 
concurrent with trade liberalization. With due regard to the 
increasing dependency on imported ore and concentrates, the 
tariff applied only on metallic zinc. The system was unique 
relative to that of other countries, since it was not just 
an ad valorem tariff. Therefore it is worthwhile to look at 
the current structure of the tariff system to understand how 
the tariff has worked since trade liberalization (Table 
4.5) .
If the import price is more than 250 yen/kg, the 
tariff exemption limit, no tariff is charged? if the import 
price is more than 242 yen/kg and less than or equal to 250 
yen/kg, the tariff is calculated by subtracting the import 
price from 250 yen? and finally, if the import price is 






More than 24 2 and 
less than or equal 
to 250
Less than or equal 
to 242
Tariff Amount (yen/kg) 
0
250 - Import price 
8
Note: The tariff is applied when the grade of imported zinc 
metal is equal to or more than 97%. When the zinc 
grade is less than 97%, no tariff is charged.
Source: Mining Industry Handbook. 1989, ANRE, Tokyo.
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yen/kg. Therefore, even if the price of imported zinc is 
zero, domestic buyers have to pay a tariff of 8 yen per 
kilogram. In this case, needless to say, the ad valorem 
tariff rate is infinite. The point of the tariff system is, 
thus, that when the yen-based import price is high enough, 
no tariff is charged on imported zinc. Yet as import prices 
fall, the tariff rates rise. This sort of tariff system, 
which is called the slide tariff system, is also applied to 
the imports of metallic copper and lead.
An important issue here is how the Japanese government 
has utilized the tariff barrier since trade liberalization. 
Figure 4.3 shows the annual average European Producer Price 
(EPP) and the tariff exemption limit expressed in Japanese 
yen over the 1965-87 period. The tariff exemption limit was 
raised drastically two times since liberalization: April
1977 and April 1981 (note that the Japanese fiscal year
begins April 1, and in the figure, the higher exemption
limit is shown when it was revised during a year). What is
quite obvious from the figure is that the government raised 
the tariff exemption limit when the environment for base 
metals producers drastically changed. In 1977 the domestic 
zinc price sharply declined on account of the decline in the 
world zinc price and the appreciation of Japanese yen. The 
revision of 1981 might be a response mainly to the second 






















CALENDAR YEAR  
EPP +  EXEM PTIO N L IM IT
Figure 4,3
Tariff Exemption Limit and 
European Producer Prices
Source: Minina Industry Handbook. 1989, ANRE, Tokyo.
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costs. From 1970 to 1976, however, the tariff exemption 
limit had been rather stable while the producers were 
suffering from difficulties stated above. There may have 
been no need to utilize the tariff to restrict imports 
because the Japanese yen was generally weak against other 
major currencies during the period, so that the relative 
value for the domestic prices was higher than that of 
outside prices.
To what degree the Japanese tariff system effective? In 
other words, was the Japanese tariff barrier high relative 
to tariffs of other countries? For a comparison, it is 
convenient to translate the slide tariff into an ad valorem 
tariff because other countries set import duties on an ad 
valorem basis. As noted earlier, the EPP was quoted as a 
world main port base CIF price. Then, let us estimate the ad 
valorem tariff rates based on the Japanese yen-based EPP.
The resulting estimation is shown in Table 4.6. As noted 
above, the ad valorem tariff rates must be high when the 
zinc prices are low, yet when the prices are high enough, no 
tariff is charged. In the latter half of the 1960s, tariff 
rates generally exceeded 3% ad valorem, and the rates for 
1967 and 1968 were quite high. From 1970 to 1976, however, 
tariff rates were zero because the CIF prices were beyond 
the tariff exemption limit. From 1977, tariff rates changed
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Table 4.6










1965 110,900 550 0.5
1966 106,200 3,900 3.7
1967 101,600 5,300 5.2
1968 97,200 7,600 7.6
1969 103,600 3,700 3.6
1970 110,500 0 0.0
1971 119,600 0 0.0
1972 119,200 0 0.0
1973 166,973 0 0.0
1976 225,757 0 0.0
1975 262,700 0 0.0





1977 193,500 8,000 6.1
1978 128,100 8,000 6.2
1979 176,600 8,000 6.6
1980 181,800 8,000 6.6
1981 202,900 8,000 3.9
1982 212,000 8,000 3.8
1983 196,800 8,000 6.1
1986 238,900 8,000 3.3
1985 206,300 8,000 3.9
1986 136,500 8,000 5.9
1987 119,900 8,000 6.7
Source: Data from Minina Industry Handbook, 1989, ANRE, 
Tokyo.
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and generally around 4% except for 1977, 1986, and 1987. For
those years, the ad valorem rates were around 6%.
In contrast to the Japanese ad valorem tariff rates,
the current tariff rates of the United States and the
European Economic Community (EEC) are relatively moderate.
The U.S. import duty on slab zinc was set at 1.9% ad
valorem, effective January 1, 1980, to 1.5% by January 1,
1987. EEC, on the other hand, set its duty at 3.5%.
Therefore, we can conclude that the Japanese import duty was
generally higher than that of the United States and the EEC.
Tariff is, needless to say, a policy measure to protect
domestic industries from foreign counterparts. It is often
utilized when the domestic industries are less competitive.
What then do Japanese high tariff rates since trade
liberalization mean? Do high rates mean the Japanese zinc
smelters are not internationally competitive? Jolly (1985,
p. 934) provided an answer.
Because a duty on slab zinc permits a slightly 
higher than otherwise domestic price, the duty 
results in a direct benefit to domestic zinc mines 
and integrated smelters. Additionally, custom 
smelters can afford to pay more for imported 
concentrates if the metal is to be sold in the 
domestic market.
As Jolly pointed out, although custom smelters can also
enjoy the high tariff wall, the Japanese slide tariff system
is designed to protect domestic mines. In Japan, tariff has
not been charged on imported zinc concentrate so that the
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tariff would not damage the domestic smelters. As noted in
Chapter 2, however, while the consumption of imported zinc
concentrate has fluctuated, the consumption of domestic
concentrate has been relatively stable. This indicates that
the Japanese zinc mines have been able to maintain a stable
supply no matter how much prices declined. This was partly
made possible by the "slide" tariff system.
Slide tariff rates have been determined based on
production costs and financial positions of domestic mines,
and MITI has guided smelters to purchase domestic
concentrate at the prices which are higher than those of
imported concentrate at least up to the amount of tariff.
Further, when the mine costs increased significantly, or
when falling zinc prices adversely affected the financial
positions of mines, the tariff rates were raised by MITI.
The increases in the tariff exemption limits in fiscal 1977
and 1981, for example, were carried out because MITI tried
to save the domestic mines:
To protect the domestic nonferrous metals mining 
industry, a tariff is charged on imported copper, 
lead, and zinc metals. The Ministry of Inter­
national Trade and Industry has guided the 
smelters to purchase domestic zinc ore at prices 
that reflect the production costs of domestic 
mines (MITI, 1987, P. 115).
In 1977, MITI temporarily introduced a "tariff 
restitution system." Because the tariff was instituted on 
imported slab zinc, smelters raised their sales prices in
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the domestic market by the amount of the tariff. The
smelters' purchase price of domestic concentrates included
the amount of tariff, so that there was no extra revenue for
the smelters when they sold the primary zinc made from
domestic concentrates. However, when the smelters sold
primary zinc made from imported ore, they could get extra
revenue in the amount of the tariff. Then, MITI guided the
smelters to give the revenue to the domestic mines as a
subsidy. This system was also used for copper (during fiscal
1975-1978) and lead (in fiscal 1978). In case of zinc,
«
subsidies awarded the mines amounted to 13,000 yen per ton 
of ore production in fiscal 1972, and 14,000 yen per ton of 
production in fiscal 1973 (JMIA, 1978, p. 96).
Thus, the high tariff rates since trade liberalization, 
charged when zinc prices were low, have primarily been 
designed to help high cost Japanese zinc mines. To be fair, 
however, there have been internationally competitive zinc 
mines in Japan. The world famous Kamioka mine of Mitsui 
Metal Mining is a typical example. In addition, extremely 
high-cost zinc mines have closed even under high tariff 
protection. In general, Japanese zinc mines have required 
the tariff barrier because of their high production costs. 
And, in principle and practice, MITI has utilized the tariff 
to protect domestic mines and not to protect the smelters.
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The above discussion, however, explains the purpose of 
the tariff system and it does not prove that Japanese zinc 
smelters are internationally competitive especially after 
the first oil crisis. The next section will examine the 
current competitiveness of Japanese zinc smelters.
4.3 Current Cost Competitiveness
As discussed in section 4.1, Japanese smelters suffered 
after the oil crisis. To be internationally competitive, the 
production cost must be low. The oil crises made energy 
prices in Japan high relative to prices in other zinc- 
producing countries. The appreciation of yen also raised the 
relative production costs of the Japanese smelters, the 
question is then, are Japanese smelters sufficiently 
competitive without government protection? The final section 
of this chapter focuses on this question.
A study by the U.S. Bureau of Mines (1985, P. 149) 
presents zinc production costs of eight countries:
Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Spain, and 
the United States (Table 4.7). Japan, Canada, Australia, and 
the United States are especially important; these four 
countries account for approximately 4 0% of total slab zinc 
production in the market economy countries. Canada, 




Zinc Production Costs in Selected Countries









Japan 0.28 0.10 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.48
Australia 0.15 0.04 0.32 0.03 0.30 0.24
Canada 0.20 0.12 0.34 0.07 0.20 0.53
Italy 0.18 0.07 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.35
ilexico 0.26 0.08 0.25 0.03 0.39 0.23
Peru 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.38
Spain 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.36
United States 0.22 0.11 0.28 0.02 0.13 0.50
Other 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.27
Total or Average 0.19 0.09 0.26 0.04 0.22 0.36
Note: All costs are in January 1985 U.S. dollars per pound 
of recoverable zinc on a weighted-average base.
Source: An Appraisal of Minerals Availability for 34
Commodities, (bulletin 692), 1985, U.S.Bureau of 
Mines.
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Mine operating costs in Japan are the highest among the 
eight countries, almost twice as high as that of Australia, 
and more than twice as high as Peru. High energy costs in 
Japan are partly responsible. However, the main reason is 
Japan's relatively low zinc grade and the small capacity 
(Table 4.8). The grade of Japan's primary zinc deposit is 
about 4.9%. In Australia, Canada, and Peru, it is 9.6%,
6.8%, and 6.7%. The ore capacity of Japanese mines ranges 
from 12 0,000 to 954,000 metric tons per year; the average is 
about 430,000 tons. The averaged mine capacities of major 
ore producing countries are larger. For example, Canada and 
Australia exceed 1 million tons per year. Lower grade zinc 
may cause inefficiency in mine operations. Small capacity 
may hinder the achievement of economies of scale.
In contrast, Japanese smelting-refining, and 
transportation costs are remarkably low. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the location of Japanese refineries contributes 
to the transportation costs. The distances between mines and 
refineries, and between refineries and zinc users are 
important. Also, the method of transportation is critical. 
High transportation costs in Canada may be the result of 
dependency on land transport and distant markets. Canadian 
zinc mines are generally located far inland, and the major 
markets for zinc concentrate are Europe and Japan. Canada's 
main zinc metal market, the United States, is also
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Table 4.8
Grades and Capacity of Zinc Mines 












Australia 11 9.55 7, 000 200 1, 640
Canada 30 6.84 3,500 181 1,138
West Germany 3 8.90 850 277 511
Japan 8 4.92 954 120 427
Mexico 19 3 .55 3,500 124 654
Peru 18 6.72 2,820 100 531
United States 50 5.56 2,820 114 623
Source: An Appraisal of Minerals Availability for 34 
Commodities, (Bulletin 692), 1985, USBM.
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relatively distant. In Japan, the major slab zinc market for 
the smelters is the domestic market.
Japanese smelters have made impressive cost reductions 
since the oil crisis. Although it is hard to find 
satisfactory quantitative evidence, because of several 
technological improvements, such as (1) the shift of the 
electric power source from oil to coal, terrestrial heat, 
and heat generated in the smelting process; (2) the 
reduction of the unit consumption of energy, especially 
electricity; and (3) the mechanization and the automation of 
the smelting process, "production costs have been largely 
reduced" (Kuroko, 1989, p. 100). Still, Japanese smelting 
costs seem to be too low because the country's energy cost 
is quite high. This point will be discussed later.
The resulting net operating cost of Japanese mines and 
smelters shown in Table 4.7 is the third highest following 
Canada and the United States. Obviously, this is because of 
the high operating costs of Japanese zinc mines. To 
summarize, if the Japanese smelters use domestic 
concentrate, the competitiveness of the Japanese zinc 
industry as a whole becomes quite fragile. If not, that is, 
not as integrated smelters but as custom smelters, Japanese 
primary zinc producers are internationally competitive. The 
Japanese zinc mines seem to burden the smelters. MITI has 
tried to protect the indigenous zinc mines by encouraging
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smelters to use the expensive domestic zinc concentrate.
This policy obviously worsens the competitiveness of 
smelters. Thus, although the tariff benefits custom 
smelters, it is more reasonable to think that the tariff has 
been necessary because of the high cost of domestic mines. 
The Japanese government has utilized the tariff system not 
to protect the smelters but to encourage them to use 
domestic, expensive, zinc concentrate.
To understand this, let us make a rough calculation 
based on the USBM study. In January 1985, the European 
Producer Price was 900 U.S. dollars per metric ton, which is 
equivalent to 4 0.82 cents/lb. The estimated ad valorem 
tariff rate in that year was 3.9% (see Table 4.6). Thus, the 
amount of tariff was 1.59 cents/lb. On the other hand, Japan 
imported zinc concentrates mainly from Australia, Peru, and 
Canada in 1985; Australia supplied about 55% of total 
imported concentrates (zinc content base), and the figures 
for Peru and Canada were 24% and 8%. Let us assume that 
Japan imported zinc concentrates only from these three 
countries, say, 60% from Australia, 30% from Peru, and 10% 
from Canada. Then, weighted average mine and mill cost of 
imported zinc concentrates can be calculated (using figures 
found in Table 4.7) as follows:
6/10 * 19 + 3/10 * 21 + 1/10 * 32 = 20.9 cents/lb
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In 1985, domestic concentrates accounted for about 40% of 
total concentrates smelted in Japan. Then, the weighted 
average mine and mill cost for Japanese smelters can be 
calculated as follows:
3/5 * 20.9 + 2/5 * 38 = 27.7 cents/lb 
The difference, 6.8 cents/lb (27.7 - 20.9), is the burden of 
expensive domestic concentrates on the Japanese smelters. 
This burden (6.8 cents/lb) is obviously higher than the 
amount of tariff (1.6 cents/lb). However, Japanese zinc 
metal was competitive with the zinc metal produced in 
Australia, Peru, and Canada because of the Japan's low 
smelting-refining cost. If we suppose that Japan imports not 
zinc concentrates but zinc metal from these three countries, 
the following weighted average smelting-refining cost should 
be added to the mine and mill operating cost.
6/10 * 32 + 3/10 * 20 + 1/10 * 34 = 28.6 cents/lb 
The difference between Japanese smelting-refining cost (19 
cents/lb) and the above result (28.6 cents/lb) amounts to 
9.6 cents/lb, and this exceeds the burden of domestic 
concentrates (6.8 cents/lb). Therefore, Japanese zinc metal 
was competitive with imports in domestic market. And, 
according to this calculation, the tariff appears a mere 
partial encouragement for the Japanese smelters to use 
expensive domestic concentrates.
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The problem with the USBM study is that it was carried 
out in January 1985 and does not describe the cost 
competitiveness of Japanese smelters after the steep 
appreciation of the yen beginning in June 1985. A 1987 study 
provided by Brook Hunt & Associates Ltd. (1988), Tables 4.9 
and 4.10, illustrates the cost comparison of zinc refineries 
in Japan, Canada, Australia, the United States, and some 
European countries. Both tables consist of two parts. One is 
the smelting cost, which includes the net cash operating 
costs and noncash depreciation costs. The other is the 
"bonus metal" revenue, which arises from the fact that 
smelters pay for no more than 85% of the zinc in 
concentrates purchased, while the smelter's recovery of zinc 
is generally in excess of 85%. "Other" bonus metal includes 
the byproduct metals such as cadmium and silver. In terms of 
ISP plant (Table 4.9), two Japanese plants— Harima and 
Hachinohe— show relatively high smelting costs following 
Porto Vesme (Italy) and Duisburg (West Germany). However, 
because of the high bonus metal revenues, the net operating 
costs of these two Japanese plants are the lowest among the 
refineries. As a consequence, the Japanese ISP zinc plants 
are sufficiently competitive.
With regard to electrolysis zinc plants (Table 4.10), 
the smelting cost of the Japanese Iijima refinery is quite 
high. Compared with the lowest cost refinery, Jersey
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Table 4.9
Cost Comparison of ISP Plants 
(in cent/lb zinc, 1987)
Saelter Country Annual 
Capacity 
(ooo NT)
Seelting Cost Bonus Hetal Net
Operating
CostNet Cash Degree. Total Zinc Other Total
Hariaa Japan 79 25.0 2.7 27.7 9.9 7.9 17.8 9.9
Hachinohe Japan 89 25.2 2.8 2B.0 9.9 9.2 19.1 11.9
Cockle Creek Australia 70 19.1 2.0 21.1 2.5 9.3 9.8 19.3
Novelles Bodault France 110 29.8 3.0 27.8 1.5 9.8 9.3 21.5
Porto Vesee Italy 70 27.8 1.9 29.2 2.0 3.1 5.1 29.1
Avonaouth U.K. 90 21.3 2.8 29.1 0.9 9.0 9.9 19.7
Duisburg W. Sereany 90 27.1 1.9 28.7 1.9 9.0 7.9 21.1
Source: Data from Economics of Zinc Smelting, 1988, Brook 
Hunt & Associates Ltd., London.
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Table 4.10
Cost Comparison of Electrolysis Zinc Plants 
(in cent/lb zinc, 1987)
Sseiter Country Annual 
Capacity 
(dod NT)
Saelting Cost Bonus Hetal Met
Operating
CostNet Cash Deprec. Total Zinc Other Total
Iijiaa Japan 156 19.9 3.5 23.6 6.6 3.1 9.7 13.7
Risdon Australia 216 12.7 1.9 16.6 1.6 1.2 2.8 11.8
Balen Belgiua 180 16.0 3.5 19.5 2.0 1.9 3.9 15.6
Overpelt Belgiua 165 19.5 2.1 21.6 1.6 2.0 3.6 18.0
Kidd Creek Canada 128 17.9 1.7 19.6 2.0 1.8 3.8 15.8
Trail Canada 273 16.5 3.9 20.6 1.3 3.3 6.6 15.8
Valleyfield Canada 230 11.7 3.0 16.7 3.1 0.3 3.6 11.3
Kokola Finland 161 16.3 2.1 16.6 1.5 0.7 2.2 16.2
Auby France 205 16.9 6.0 18.9 1.7 1.0 2.7 16.2
Budel Holand 125 15.2 3.0 18.2 2.1 0.5 2.6 15.6
Crotone Italy 100 18.6 1.6 19.9 0.7 1.0 1.7 18.2
Porto Vesae Italy 83 11.2 9.2 20.6 1.5 1.3 2.8 17.6
Bartlesville U.S. 51 17.6 1.5 18.9 3.6 2.6 5.3 13.1
Clarksville U.S. 92 10.3 2.5 12.8 3.2 0.8 6.0 8.8
Sauget U.S. 77 16.1 1.5 17.6 1.8 1.8 3.6 16.0
Datteln U. Seraany 165 17.5 2.5 20.0 1.6 1.2 2.8 17.2
Nordenhaa U. Seraany 126 13.6 2.0 15.6 1.9 1.2 3.1 12.5
Source: Data from Economics of Zinc Smelting, 1988, Brook 
Hunt & Associates Ltd., London.
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Minieres' Clarksville refinery in the United States, the 
Iijima's cost is almost twofold. This may be chiefly because 
of high Japanese electricity costs. Again, because of high 
bonus metal revenues, resulting net operating cost of Iijima 
is the sixth lowest among the listed 17 refineries. Thus, in 
terms of net cash smelting cost and despite producer cost 
reduction efforts, Japanese zinc smelters have lost their 
competitiveness because of high energy prices and the 
appreciation of the yen. What Japanese producers have done 
against deteriorating competitiveness is to enlarge the 
recovery of zinc and other byproduct metals. In this regard, 
the Japanese smelting cost shown in the above Bureau of 
Mines study seem too low. The byproduct credit of Japan also 
appears to be too low. This may be because the Japanese 
smelting cost in the USBM study include some of the 
byproduct revenues.
The main reason for the high Japanese bonus-metal 
revenues may be that Japanese producers since the 1960s have 
made special efforts to increase the recovery of metals from 
concentrate. The achievement of high recovery has been 
considered as one of the most basic measures of the 
rationalization of refineries. They have eagerly invested in 
the development and improvement of technology and facilities 
to this end.
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This raises the question: why have smelters in other 
countries not followed Japan's lead and matched the latter's 
high byproduct recovery? This is a difficult question to 
answer. However, some incentives for the Japanese smelters 
can be pointed out. First, the effects of the oil crises and 
the appreciation of the yen have been particularly 
destructive for the Japanese. These problems, for example, 
were not as severe for Canadian producers who have enjoyed 
low electricity rates and whose currency has followed quite 
close the U.S. dollar. Thus, for survival, the Japanese have 
had to rationalize their operations. Second, environmental 
regulations in Japan are among the most stringent in the 
world, and have forced the Japanese to control carefully the 
discharge of metals. The achievement of high metal recovery 
thus contributes to the reduction of pollution. Third, 
markets for various metals are expanding in Japan. The 
domestic demand for cadmium was 1,063 tons in fiscal 1980 
and increased to 2,303 tons in 1987. This expansion was 
mainly brought about by the use of cadmium in batteries (515 
tons in 1980; 1,774 tons in 1987). Further, although the 
amounts are still small, the markets for other rare metals 
such as gallium, arsenic, and indium are also growing. These 
metals are called "new materials" in Japan, and are used in 
the growing high-tech semiconductor and electronics 
industries.
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To conclude, at least three Japanese refineries have 
maintained international competitiveness. However, it should 
be noted that not all the Japanese smelters have survived 
the steep appreciation.of yen after 1985. As noted earlier, 
about 15% of smelting capacity have been closed due to its 
unprofitability. In addition, Japan has become a net zinc 
importing country since the mid-198 0s. These changes 
obviously indicate that the Japanese zinc smelting industry 




Japanese metal mining has a long history. Mining of 
copper, for example, was initiated in the early eighth 
century. Metallic minerals, especially precious and base 
metals, have been the most significant natural resources.
For more than one thousand years, until 1896, the production 
of metallic minerals was more or less under the control of 
the political authorities.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when the Japanese economy was in its early developing stage, 
metal mining played a key role in Japanese 
industrialization. First, the precious and base metals, 
especially gold, silver, and copper, were the main 
commodities for export next to silk and tea. One of the 
highest priorities of the government at that time was to 
encourage modern industry, which was rightly seen as the 
source of the superior power of the West. Metal products, 
thus, were needed to obtain Western technology and 
facilities. Second, metal mining was at the center of the 
formation of Japanese early industrial capital. Several 
"zaibatsu,11 the major force of Japanese industrialization in 
the private sector, had their origin in metal mining.
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In contrast to Japanese steel, aluminium, and other 
basic materials industries, the Japanese nonferrous metals 
industry began with mining. Smelting and refining businesses 
were added later. Accordingly, for many years, the producers 
regarded themselves as mining companies rather than as 
smelter companies. Even today all the nonferrous metals 
producers are members of the Japan Mining Industry 
Association, rather than the Smelting Industry Association. 
With the historical importance of metal mining, and also the 
orientation of producers toward mining, postwar Japanese 
industrial policy for the mineral industry has focused on 
the mining sector rather than the smelting and refining 
sector. All the tax relief, subsidies, and opportunities to 
utilize special government loans have been given primarily 
to the mining sector.
Nonetheless, as observed in the previous chapters, 
Japanese industrial policy has played an important role in 
the zinc smelting and refining industry.
When Japanese slab zinc production was rapidly 
expanding, MITI focused on strengthening the international 
competitiveness of the smelters through coordinating 
facility investment. This intervention was expected to 
mitigate the "excessive" competition among firms. During 
this period, the Japanese zinc smelters became successful 
international competitors. MITI's guidance to construct the
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"joint refineries," which are still competitive today, can 
be favorably evaluated. However, industrial policy does not 
seem to have played a central role in the creation of the 
smelters' competitiveness. What motivated the smelting 
industry was an intense competition among domestic smelters, 
which MITI considered a weakness of the industry.
Since 1970, the goal of industrial policy has shifted 
from a growth-oriented policy to a policy that takes 
advantage of growth. Policy has departed from its former 
promoting, interventionist nature. Environmental regulations 
have adversely affected the competitiveness of the smelters 
by raising their production costs. Still, in terms of the 
public welfare, environmental regulations were late in 
coming. Too many people suffered and died because of 
industrial pollution. To some extent, the rapid growth of 
the Japanese zinc smelters as well as the whole Japanese 
economy was achieved at the expense of the welfare of 
people.
After the oil crisis, the financial health of the 
smelters declined markedly. The government's reaction was to 
initiate the stockpiling program. This worked as a temporary 
measure to give a short-term relief to base metals producers 
who had excess inventories. Stockpiling did not work as a 
buffer stock or as a protectionist measure. Its main 
contribution may be that it allowed Japanese producers to
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avoid bankruptcy. The policy can be regarded as governmental 
assistance to absorb the shock of the huge demand-supply 
gap.
The tariff system introduced in 1964 has protected the 
Japanese zinc industry, specifically when zinc prices were 
low. The tariff benefits the custom smelters because they 
can raise their sales prices in the domestic market.
However, the tariff system is primarily designed to protect 
domestic mines, not smelters. Japanese zinc mines in general 
have had high production costs. The government has 
encouraged the smelters to use expensive domestic zinc 
concentrates and to purchase these concentrates at the 
prices favorable to the mines. This obviously weakens the 
competitiveness of the smelters. The tariff system has 
helped offset the high cost of using domestic concentrates.
Thus, despite stockpiling and the tariff, the Japanese 
government has not actively protected the zinc smelters 
since trade liberalization. One of the reasons the 
government has not protected the smelters is the fact that 
zinc is a significant input for other industries. For the 
government to protect zinc smelters, and to allow the 
smelters to be inefficient would worsen the competitiveness 
of zinc users such as the Japanese steel and automotive 
industries, two of the key industries in the Japanese 
economy.
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In addition, the government's focus has been more on 
exploration and development of indigenous and overseas 
resources to stabilize the supply of minerals rather than 
just on the protection of existing, high-cost mines. Table 
5.1 shows the government's budget and investment in the 
nonenergy mineral industry since 1965. What is obvious is 
that, excluding guarantees, the government has invested more 
money in the exploration and development of resources than 
other purposes. Furthermore, the number of Japanese copper, 
lead-zinc, and other nonferrous metals mines, the number of 
mine workers, and the production of nonferrous base metals 
has steadily declined (Table 5.2). This seems to indicate 
that government policy has not overly protected domestic 
mines. Japanese mines have been closed not only because of 
the exhaustion of deposits but also because of the economy 
of mines. The role of government policies, such as tariffs 
and subsidies, seems to have been to slow the decline of 
domestic mining rather than to ensure their future. Japanese 
lead-zinc mines employed about 7,000 workers in 1972; they 
employ about 500 today.
Since trade liberalization, the most notable trend in 
the Japanese zinc industry is that, despite the government's 
protection of domestic mines, the nature of the Japanese 
zinc industry has steadily changed from a mining industry to 
a smelting industry. From the standpoint of the industry's
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Table 5.1
Budget and Investment of the Japanese Government 
in the Nonenergy Minerals Industry 
(in million yen)















































Note: Expenses include all subsidies and government
disbursements for each purpose. Guarantees are given 
to firms and government agencies when they borrow 
from private banks. Stockpiles include those for 
copper, lead, zinc, aluminium, and rare metals.




Number of Nonferrous Metals Mines, 
Mine Workers, and Mine Production of 
Copper, Lead, and Zinc in Japan
1960 1970 1975 1980 1987
Number of Mines
Copper 174 73 28 15 4
Lead-Zinc 18 15 11 6 5
Other 517 158 67 50 25
Total 709 246 106 71 34




Copper 90.5 119.6 83.9 52.7 20.9
Lead 40.5 66.2 50.7 46.3 25.1
Zinc 160.9 288.7 258.2 337.6 153.7
Source: Nonferrous Metals. 1989, Kuroko, Tokyo.
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competitiveness, this trend is quite rational and 
reasonable. Despite the adverse circumstances after the 
first oil crisis, the majority of the Japanese smelters seem 
to have maintained competitiveness in the Japanese market at 
least until the first half of 1980s. Although Japanese 
smelters had already lost competitiveness in terms of cash 
production cost, they have been able to survive because of 
relatively high byproduct revenues.
After 1985, however, the industry suffered because of 
the steep appreciation of yen. Although some surviving 
Japanese smelters seem to still be competitive, some may not 
be. The declining trend of the industry until 1987 reversed 
in 1988 because of the increase in domestic and world zinc 
prices, and because of the booming Japanese economy. In 
response to the increasing domestic demand for zinc, some 
Japanese zinc smelters are planning to expand capacity 
again. High zinc prices allow the internationally marginal 
producers to survive. If prices decline again, marginal 
producers will have to exit the industry.
In looking at the future competitiveness of Japanese 
zinc smelters, an important trend in the industry should be 
noted. The Japanese zinc smelters, as well as other smelters 
in industrialized countries, now are trying to develop and 
produce more refined, higher value-added zinc products, such 
as zinc alloyed with an amount of other metals to be used in
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galvanized steel. These zinc products, called "tailored 
zinc," are highly differentiated from ordinary, just "high- 
purity" zinc metal. The current strategy to maintain 
competitiveness at least within the domestic market is 
through product differentiation. In Japan, it is said that 
approximately 60% of the total zinc metal produced is 
differentiated, "tailored," zinc for Japanese users, and 
that it is difficult for foreign smelters to provide these 
zinc products to Japanese market because close and frequent 
collaboration with users is required (to be fair, the 
Japanese cannot provide tailored zinc for foreign users 
either).
The future competitiveness of the Japanese zinc 
smelters will depend on zinc prices, the value of the yen, 
energy prices, and the domestic industry's ability to 
maintain a technological lead particularly in byproduct and 
zinc recovery. While it is difficult to forecast these 
variables, and hence the future competitiveness of the 
Japanese smelters, the history of Japanese industrial policy 
toward the zinc industry strongly suggests that Japanese 
smelters cannot rely on the government for permanent 
protection. If the smelters fail to maintain their 
competitiveness, they may receive some temporary support 
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